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Minimum Wage
The Bridge of Asses (Re Minimum Wages)
by Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr.
Many states have enacted higher minimum wage laws than are imposed by the
federal government. The federal minimum is $5.15 per hour, whereas in
Washington State it will soon be $7.16. A proposal in Madison, Wisconsin,
would raise it to $7.75. "Living wage" legislation in 110 local
governments
imposes wages as high as $10. Senator Kennedy is supporting a bill that
would boost it nationally to higher than $6. In Britain it is $7.20 per
hour, while Venezuela and Russia set minimum wages by the month.
Senator Kennedy says that these laws are essential to make sure that no
working person lives in poverty, which is a strange thing to say, if you
think about it. The reason a person works is precisely so that the person
will not live in poverty. The minimum wage law does nothing but specify
the
floor below which a person may not work, and thus it can only, on the
margin, increase the likelihood of poverty. If the key to eliminating
poverty were more severe laws, why not forbid people from working for
less
than $100 per hour?
Economic libertarians focus on the fallacy of minimum-wage legislation
because the issue serves as a window through which to observe the very
soul
of a policy world view. It is the pons asinorum of the relationship
between
economics and politics. If the free market works - meaning the existence of
exchange under private property and contract enforcement - then there is no
need for such laws; indeed, such laws do violence to the market. If, on
the
other hand, we need such laws to guard against exploitation and to boost
living standards, there is every reason for all-round central planning.
If economic libertarians can convince someone to give up support for the
minimum wage (and such laws enjoy massive public support), the rest falls
into place. After all, the wage is but a price for labor services, a
price
that works like any other in the sense that it is subject to the laws of
supply and demand. The employer wants to pay zero, while the employee
wants
$1 million per hour. The actual market wage results from economic forces
that turn these seemingly irreconcilable demands into a cooperative
contract
that benefits everyone.
So it is with all economic transactions. The buyer wants to pay zero and
the
seller wants the highest price possible. But reality intervenes to curb
these initial impulses. Economic actors are constantly faced with limited
means, including money and time. Because of these limits, actors face
competing demands. This competition between alternative uses of resources
brings into play certain dynamics that cause the seller to realize that
he
can't charge too high a price and the buyer to realize that he can't pay
zero.
In the labor contract, the seller is the laborer hawking his labor
services,
while the employer is the buyer purchasing such services. If you want to
understand the psychology of the employer faced with a hiring decision,
imagine your attitude as you shop in any retail outlet. You examine the
goods and compare the benefits you will receive from paying what the
seller
is asking in exchange. You want to economize on resources an impulse that
is
praiseworthy because it leads to minimizing waste. Why should we expect
any
less of the employer, who similarly wants to economize?
Now, again, it is always true that the buyer wants to pay less than the
seller is offering, while the seller always wants more. So too in the
labor
contract: the seller of the labor services (no, the laborer does not
actually sell himself, so let's hear none of this rhetoric about how you
can't put a price tag on people) always wants more, while the buyer of
labor
services always wants to pay less (no employers are not unusually
penurious;
they are no different from any buyer in the marketplace). The wage is
nothing but a compromise between these two demands in light of existing
realities.
What are the existing realities? There are many. There is the quality of
the
services to consider. Will this person make a contribution to the overall
profitability of the firm, if not now then after a period of time? How
much
of a contribution will the person make compared with how much employing
the
person will cost in terms of others' time and company resources? Will the
person stick around so that it is worth putting in the time to train the
person? Does the person in question have a history and the credentials
that
minimize the risk to the employer? Is this person likely to be litigious
and
bring lawsuits crashing down on the company?
Another major factor that weighs on the buyer's decision is the reality
that
the seller (the laborer) faces a huge range of buyers to whom his or her
services could be offered. There are always competing demands on time.
The
employer must make an offer good enough to draw the potential employee
away
from whatever other things he or she might otherwise be doing, whether it
is
working for someone else or just lazying around the house.
To make the contract work, it is essential that both parties to the
exchange
have maximum flexibility. If the worker is brilliant and experienced, he
can
viably put a high price on his services. If he has to change occupations
and
is trying to gain new skills, is just starting out in the workforce, or
is
disabled in some way, he may need to start the bargaining process with a
much lower than average wage offer. He might even want to begin with an
unpaid apprenticeship. In fact, he might want to begin with a "negative
wage" that is, arranging for a parent or someone else to actually pay the
employer to hire the person.
Now, let's return to the minimum wage. Most of the discussion concerning
these laws focuses on the impact on the business owner. But the really
important point concerns the effect on the worker. It amounts to the
government coercively limiting the price that the seller of labor
services
can offer on the market. It says to the worker, in effect: you may not
offer
too low a price for what you have to offer or else the government will
show
up and crack some skulls. Thus it doesn't do any favors to the worker;
instead it removes the control that the person has over the conditions
under
which he or she may offer to work.
The worker who decides to start a new career or is just beginning in the
marketplace thus faces a limited range of options. There are conditions
under which it could amount to shutting the person out of licit
employment
altogether and instead force the person to work in the underground
economy.
It could force him to be unemployed and be permanently shut out of the
marketplace so that not even labor data know he exists. It could impose
on
him the mandate to only work in professions that earn the highest salary
rather than pursuing some other line of work that may pay less in the
short
run on the bet that it will eventually pay more in the long run.
In discussions of the minimum wage, the question always arises: does it
lead
to unemployment as measured by the data? What follows is a blizzard of
studies, some showing that unemployment goes up after the laws are
passed,
some seeming to show no change, and even some seeming to show that
unemployment goes down. What all these amount to is an elaborate and
fallacious leap that purports to show that because one event followed
another, the latter event must have necessarily been caused by the
former.
Human engagement in a market setting is actually too complicated to be
captured by such statistical manipulations.
What these studies cannot show are the invisible effects of such laws.
How
many jobs were held onto because the minimum wage limited the workers'
options? How much extra productivity was required of marginal workers
because the employer was forced into hiring people who might otherwise
produce less than they are paid to produce? How many people have moved
out
of mandatory high-wage areas into areas where wages are more flexible?
How
many workers might otherwise be hired were it not for the existence of
minimum wages?
We can know via logic that the minimum wage leads to less hiring at rates
below the minimum wage than there would otherwise be in absence of the
laws.
There should be no question that this is the case, since this is
precisely
what the laws are supposed to do. This is why unions are the top
advocates
of minimum wage laws even though very few of the union rank-and-file earn
the minimum wage. Clearly, they are trying to keep a lock on the job
market
and limit competitive pressure from low-wage workers. Can all of these
forces be illustrated in the politicized "studies" trotted out to show
that
the minimum wage causes no harm? Not in any way. In an economy driven by
the
choices of human beings, statistical data cannot reveal all.
The debate over minimum wage laws goes to the very core of how we view
the
relationship between economics and politics. Politicians who enact these
laws imagine themselves as central planners magically bringing compassion
and high living standards into being with the stroke of a pen. People who
support the laws have a flawed view of the market process that sees
exploitation behind all exchange relationships. Unions that back them are
selfishly using the political process to enrich themselves at others'
expense.
Only economic libertarians understand the actual reality: the minimum
wage
is a violent imposition on the freedom of association that harms all of
society in the long run. The US has been blessed by the fact that
pressure
to increase the minimum wage has been resisted at the federal level for
many
years. If we care about reducing unemployment and retaining the
conditions
for future prosperity, we had better not make the mistake of increasing
it.
If Congress had any economic sense, it would repeal all these laws
forthwith.
Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr., is president of the Mises Institute and
editor
of LewRockwell.com.
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